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With global personal information flows increasing, efforts have been made to de-
velop principles to standardize data protection regulations. However, no set ofprinci-
ples has yet achieved universal adoption. This note proposes a principle mandating that
personal data be securely destroyed when it is no longer necessary for the purpose for
which it was collected. Including a data deletion principle in future data protection
standards will increase respect for individual autonomy and decrease the risk of abuse
of personal data. Though data deletion is already practiced by many data controllers,
including it in legal data protection mandates wil further the goal of establishing an
effective global data protection regime.
INTRODUCTION
With the rise of digital storage and information searching technologies, peo-
ple's lives have become increasingly documented.' Financial transactions, visits to
the doctor, job applications, and even web searches produce information that can
be used to identify a particular individual and serve as a record of his or her pri-
vate activities. If one could keep track of and control all of one's data, perhaps this
* Editor-in-Chief, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies. J.D. candidate, 2009, Indiana Uni-
versity Maurer School of Law - Bloomington, B.A. with highest distinction, 2006, University of
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ubiquitous record-keeping would cause little concern. But data does not stay in
one place, or even one country. Instead, personal information is frequently trans-
ferred across national borders.2 Multinational corporations transfer data between
offices in different nations; organizations outsource data processing to entities in
other countries; and citizens of different nations complete transactions with each
other, transferring personal data in the process.
This increased data flow creates uncertainty about which data protection
laws apply to personal information. Nations protect their citizens' information
privacy in different ways, and entities that collect, process, or store personal infor-
mation (data controllers) have the difficult task of determining how to comply
with applicable laws. If the data controllers have trouble knowing what they may
do with a given set of data in a given jurisdiction, how can the individuals whose
information is in the data set-the data subjects-know what can be done with
their personal information?
There are many benefits to global transfers of personal data,3 but confusion
and disagreement over treatment of personal information in different jurisdic-
tions can prevent, and have prevented, these benefits from being fully realized.
For example, European law has been an obstacle to some transfers of data, such as
airline passenger data, to the United States. 4 The United States government was
interested in transfers of airline passenger data for national security reasons.
While an interim agreement was eventually reached that enabled the United
States to receive the information and a final accord is near,' for a time, air travel
between the United States and Europe was threatened by disagreement over how
European travelers' Passenger Name Records (PNR) would be transferred, pro-
cessed, and stored. Also, the European Union has taken steps against data con-
trollers who retain data for too long; the situation of America-based search engine
Google illustrates the difficulties divergent data protection laws can cause.6 In
sum, inconsistent data protection laws have impeded beneficial global transfers of
2. Miriam Wugmeister et al., Global Solution for Cross-Border Data Transfers: Making the Case
for Corporate Privacy Rules, 38 GEo. J. INT'L L. 449, 449 (2007).
3. Id.
4. Ellen Nakashima, U.S., E.U Miss Deadline on Data-Sharing Agreement, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
2006, at A14. For background on the PNR disagreement, see generally Irfan Tukdi, Comment,
Transatlantic Turbulence: The Passenger Name Record Conflict, 45 Hous. L. REV. 587 (2008).
5. Charlie Savage, US. and Europe Near Agreement on Private Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2008,
at Al.
6. Google was warned for keeping search logs for two years. See Kevin J. O'Brien & Thomas
Crampton, European Union Warns Google on Possible Violations of Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 2007, at C3.
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personal information and have slowed important interactions between govern-
ments, companies, and individuals on a global scale.7
A promising solution to this quandary is global data protection principles-
standards developed by international bodies that serve as models for drafting and
harmonizing nations' data protection laws. If a set of data protection principles
achieved widespread acceptance, then governments, multinational corporations,
and other global actors would have consistent data protection standards that
would greatly ameliorate the difficulties caused by the current patchwork of data
protection regulations.
Unfortunately, no set of principles has yet reached this tipping point to become a
universally adopted, global standard. The Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development's Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows
of Personal Data8 have influenced many later data protection laws.9 The European
Union's Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Pro-
cessing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of Such Data'0 (hereinafter EU
Directive) has been the foundation of data protection law within the European
Union. Despite the importance of these standards, however, no global consensus on
data protection has been reached. Furthermore, the existing standards are vague and
thus unlikely to produce uniform results even if widely adopted. Even the most spe-
cific set of principles, the EU Directive, permits wide variation in national data pro-
tection laws." Most other candidates for global data protection standards, like the
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Framework, are voluntary and anticipate di-
vergent implementation by national governments. 2
This note offers a proposal for a data deletion principle to be included in fu-
ture sets of privacy standards. The data deletion principle will require data con-
7. Wugmeister,supra note 2, at 449-50. For other examples, see FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 126-27 (1997).
8. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines on the Protection of Pri-
vacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OEC Doc. 93200201HE5 (Oct. 1, 1980), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1-1_1 _1,100.html [hereinafter
OECD].
9. Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION
IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION ECONOMY' 348 (Janet K. Winn ed., 2006).
10. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.. (L 281) 31-50 (EU), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri = CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML
[hereinafter EU Directive].
11. Andrew Charlesworth, Information Privacy Law in the European Union: E Pluribus Unum or
Ex Uno Plures?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 931, 939 (2003).
12. Carla Bulord, Note, Between East and West: The APEC Privacy Framework and the Balance of
International Data Flows, 3 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'y 705, 711 (2008).
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trollers, overseen by legally authorized public or private sector data protection
agencies, to establish record destruction schedules that will apply consistently
across national boundaries and industries. Failure to comply with one's own data
destruction schedule could result in fines or liability to any individual harmed by
data that were not properly destroyed.
While the idea of a data deletion principle is not entirely novel, the interna-
tional consensus that has coalesced around other data protection principles has
not yet encompassed a deletion principle. This note argues for a strong but flexible
data deletion principle, and fleshes out the various policy considerations affected
by a legal mandate to destroy personal information. Global data protection stan-
dards should cover the entire life cycle of information, up to and including the
necessary destruction of personal information. Until a data deletion principle is
adopted as an integral part of a data protection regime that protects privacy while
permitting global data transfers, no data protection scheme will be complete.
Part I will review past sets of data protection principles and demonstrate that
data deletion has not been given sufficient attention and treatment. Part II will
argue that the omission of a data deletion principle is a fundamental weakness in
any global data protection regime. Part III will set out a proposed data deletion
principle and examine the advantages of and obstacles to its adoption.
I. THE MISSING DATA DELETION PRINCIPLE
With the advent of digital information storage and processing, personal in-
formation can be more easily collected, stored, transferred, and processed. This
raises important privacy concerns. Data protection principles have been developed
at the national and regional levels to allow for the use of personal data in benefi-
cial ways while reducing the risk of abuse. A data deletion principle would help
achieve these goals, but unlike many data protection principles, data deletion has
not yet been generally accepted.
A. Data Protection: Helping to Preserve Individual Autonomy in a Bureaucratic
World and Prevent Harmful Uses of Personal Information
Privacy and data protection implicate numerous social values and civil rights,
including autonomy over one's body, freedom from unjustified searches, control
13. SoLOVE, supra note 1, at 3-4.
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over one's public persona, and privacy in one's personal thoughts.4 Data protec-
tion principles seek to address one particular aspect of privacy: maintaining-ap-
propriate control over non-public data that relate to and identify a particular
individual. Examples of such personal information include records of financial
transactions, medical conditions, private online activities, and academic and em-
ployment histories. An appropriate balance must be struck between permitting
economically beneficial and socially essential uses of personal data while prevent-
ing harm to data subjects and giving data subjects sufficient control to maintain a
minimum degree of autonomy. 5
Data protection principles generally regulate the collection, storage, transfer,
and processing of personal data. These are important functions because as indi-
viduals' lives become more susceptible to recording and analysis, entities and insti-
tutions are more likely to use personal data to make important decisions. Personal
data can also be used by entities, institutions, and third parties capable of directly
or indirectly accessing the information in ways that may harm individuals identi-
fied by the data.
Many important decisions about individuals are based upon their personal
information. Most applications for credit cards, car loans, or mortgages are
screened on the basis of personal information contained in credit bureau reports.
Many employers run criminal background checks on prospective employees. In-
surers check personal data before issuing insurance policies. It is clear that many
essential tasks, ranging from obtaining a checking account to purchasing medi-
cine containing pseudoephedrine, require the collection, storage, and analysis of
individuals' personal information.
Much of this personal information is processed in bureaucratic organizations,
entities that are characterized by a "hierarchical chain-of-command, specialized
offices to carry out particular functions, and a system of general rules to manage
the organization."'6 Professor Solove notes that bureaucracies, while generally ef-
ficient and impartial, ignore the unusual needs of particular individuals; avoid
accountability by obscuring decision-making processes; and fail to control abuses
of functionaries' discretion. 7
14. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE 3-4 (2001).
15. See CATE, SUpra note 7, at 31.
16. SoLOVE, supra note 1, at 38.
17. Id. at 39.
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Bureaucratic decision-making processes are being exercised ever
more frequently over a greater sphere of our lives, and we have little
power or say within such a system, which tends to structure our
participation along standardized ways that fail to enable us to
achieve our goals, wants, and needs. - "
Thus, while bureaucratic processing of personal data is necessary and even
beneficial, it must be regulated to give individuals some measure of control over
their personal information, thereby forcing data controllers to respect the indi-
viduals' autonomy and allowing the individual to participate in these important
decision-making processes. Data protection principles (and, through modeling
and harmonization, national data protection laws) can regulate data controllers to
protect individual dignity and autonomy in the use of personal information.
Aside from allowing sufficient individual control in personal data processing,
data protection principles also help reduce the risk of abuses of personal data.
There are myriad ways in which personal information may be used to the severe
detriment of data subjects, ranging from the financially crippling (fraud, identity
theft, or insurance discrimination) to the relatively innocuous but irritating (un-
wanted telephone or mail solicitations).' 9 In addition to causing the loss of indi-
viduals' money, time, patience, or reputation, abuse of personal information also
reduces individuals' confidence in the systems that utilize personal data, thus lim-
iting the potential social benefits of such systems. For example, widespread adop-
tion of electronic health records, an innovation that could reduce health care costs
and facilitate valuable medical research, has been slowed, in part, by disagree-
ments over rules balancing patient privacy against beneficial uses of data.2 ° Data
protection principles that help reduce the risk of these harms will protect data
subjects' interests and increase confidence in legitimate and useful personal infor-
mation systems. These perceived benefits have prompted several attempts to de-
velop global data protection standards.
18. Id.
19. CATE, supra note 14, at 6-7.
20. Milt Freudenheim & Robert Pear, Health Hazard: Computers Spilling Your History, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2006, at 31.
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B. Current Global Data Protection Standards: Failing to Consistently Regulate Data
Deletion
Beginning in the 1970s with the United States' Fair Information Practice
Principles,2 governments have attempted to develop standards capable of serving as
conceptual foundations for data protection policies. While some sets of international
privacy principles have mentioned destruction of data as part of particular principles,
data deletion has never been deemed to merit its own complete data protection prin-
ciple. The following review of established data protection standards will illustrate
accepted data protection norms and the absence of data deletion in those standards.
1. OECD Guidelines
The first global privacy standards were proposed by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1980. The OECD Guidelines
were heavily influenced by earlier United States government work on fair informa-
tion practices.22 While not universal, the OECD Guidelines are the most widely ac-
cepted data protection standards. Thus, the OECD Guidelines represent baseline
data protection standards and have served as the foundation for later principles.23
The OECD Guidelines contain eight principles, most of which have appeared
in later sets of standards with minor variations and under slightly different names.24
The Collection Limitation Principle25 limits how personal data are collected. The
data must be collected by lawful and fair means, and generally, data subjects should
know about the data collection and provide consent. The Data Quality Principle 6
deals with how the data are maintained. Data should be kept accurate and current
to the extent the purpose of the data set requires. The Purpose Specification Prin-
ciple27 mandates that the purpose for the data collection be stated no later than at the
time of collection. The data cannot later be used for a purpose "incompatible" with
the original collection purpose. What is "incompatible" is not entirely clear, but the
21. See SEC'Y ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA Sys., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC.
& WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973).
22. Cate, supra note 9, at 348.
23. Professor Cate notes that "most of the dozens of national and regional privacy regimes ad-
opted after 1980 claim to reflect the OECD Guidelines." Id.
24. While the precise details of all data protection principles are not relevant to this Note, see
generally id., for a concise but detailed history of data protection principles.
25. OECD, supra note 8, 7.
26. Id. 8.
27. Id. 9.
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Purpose Specification Principle does reduce to some extent "function creep" (data
being collected for one purpose and then used for a different purpose later). For
example, under this principle, information collected for assessing taxes could not
later be used for issuing drivers' licenses. The Use Limitation Principle" supports
the Purpose Specification Principle by demanding that data not be disclosed or used
for purposes other than the ones specified. Exceptions are made with the data sub-
ject's consent or when authorized by law.
The Security Safeguards Principle29 requires reasonable precautions against
loss, unauthorized access, modification, disclosure, or destruction of data. The
Openness Principle" states that individuals should be able to easily determine if a
data controller has data about them and how that data may be accessed. Flowing
from the Openness Principle is the Individual Participation Principle," which
provides that procedures should exist by which data subjects may access their data.
If the data are inaccurate, the data subject should be able to challenge the data and
have them corrected or deleted. This is the only mention of data deletion in the
OECD Guidelines. Finally, the Accountability Principle32 simply states that data
controllers should be held accountable for complying with the other principles.
While collection, use, disclosure, and storage of personal data are included, the
Guidelines lack a principle regarding the destruction of data, the last stage of the
data life cycle. Only when data are incorrect does a data subject's privacy interest
require deletion (if modification of such data does not correct the inaccuracy). Per-
haps because the OECD Guidelines, the first and most widely accepted set of data
protection principles, did not substantively deal with the issue of data deletion, later
actors did not feel compelled to regulate the last stage of the data life cycle.
2. Council of Europe Convention
A year after the OECD Guidelines were adopted, the Council of Europe pro-
mulgated the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Col-
lection and Processing of Personal Data on Information Highways (COE
Convention). The COE Convention contains principles similar to the OECD
28. Id. 10.
29. Id. 11.
30. OECD, supra note 8, 112.
31. Id. 13.
32. Id. 9114.
33. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processingof Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981,20 I.L.M. 317,availableat http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
en/Treaties/Html/108.htm [hereinafter COE Convention].
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Guidelines' Collection Limitation, Use Limitation, Purpose Specification, Data
Quality, Security Safeguards, and Individual Participation Principles.34 An interest-
ing difference in the COE Convention's Data Quality Principle is a requirement that
once the need for identifying specific individuals has passed, the data should be ano-
nymized to avoid identifying specific individuals." Thus, while the COE Convention
does not require complete destruction of any data, it does require deletion of data that
can identify a specific person when the specified purpose of the data set no longer
requires identification of individuals. The requirement that data be deleted if inac-
curate and challenged by the data subject also appears in the COE Convention.3 6 Al-
though the COE Convention furthered the notion of data deletion in its data
protection standards, it ultimately fell short of creating a data deletion standard.
3. EU Directive
In 1995, the European Union (EU) adopted the Directive on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement
of Such Data (EU Directive).37 The EU Directive, similar to its data protection pre-
decessors, contains principles on collection limitation, purpose specification, data
quality, security, openness, and individual access. Like the COE Convention, the
Data Quality Principle of the EU Directive requires anonymization of data when the
data's purpose has been served.38 Additional innovations include a requirement that
the amount of data collected not be excessive relative to the collection's specified pur-
pose.39 New principles were also enacted to restrict transfers of data only to recipients
who provide an "adequate level of protection" for the data,4" to specially protect "sen-
sitive" data (data on racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs, philo-
sophical or ethical persuasion, and health and sexual life),4 and to give individuals
the right to know the logic of any processes that use their data to make automated
decisions.42 Enforcement principles were also added: one for independent oversight of
34.Id. arts. 5, 7, 8.
35. Id. art. 5(e).
36. Id. art. 8(c).
37. EU Directive, supra note 10.
38. Id. art. 6(e).
39. Id. art. 6(c).
40. Id. art. 25.
41. Id. art. 8.
42. Id. art. 12. An example of an automated decision is an automated process that analyzes certain
financial facts about an individual and thereby determines whether to grant the individual a loan.
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data controllers by government agencies, and one giving individuals enforceable
rights against data controllers who violate national data protection laws.43
The EU Directive has been called "the high-water mark of substantive legal
protection for information privacy"' and, due to its transborder transfer restric-
tions, "the closest approximation to a strong global data protection standard in
operation."45 However, the EU Directive suffers from a major omission: a princi-
ple of data deletion. National data protection laws could regulate data deletion,
but to comply with the EU Directive, national laws need only require anonymiza-
tion when the purpose for collecting the personal information no longer requires
identification and deletion when data are challenged and found to be incorrect.
A notable feature of the COE Convention and EU Directive is that they im-
pose legal duties on the signatory national governments to harmonize their data
protection laws with the principles.46 Supranational authorities can, to some ex-
tent, enforce the harmonization of national laws, facilitating data transfers be-
tween signatory countries. The flip side of this coin is that non-signatory nations
are barred from receiving data transfers unless they are deemed to have sufficient
data protection safeguards. 47 This has necessitated the Safe Harbor Agreement
between the EU and the U.S. Department of Commerce to enable transatlantic
data transfers.48 Any future global data protection standard will have to either
supplant the European standards or meet their minimum requirements.
4. APEC Privacy Framework
In 2004, the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) sought to mod-
ernize the OECD Guidelines. The final result was the adoption of the APEC
Privacy Framework (Framework). 49 The Purpose Specification Principle disap-
peared in this iteration, and new principles were added. The Framework now
43. Id. arts. 22-24.
44. Cate, supra note 9, at 351.
45. Sunni Yuen, Exporting Data with Trust:Audited Self-Regulation as a Solution to Cross-Border
Data Transfer Protection Concerns in the Offshore Outsourcing Industry, 9 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L.
REV. 41, 69 (2008), available at http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume =9&article =2.
46. COE Convention, supra note 33, art. 4; EU Directive, supra note 10, art. I.
47. CATE,supra note 7, at 126.
48. For a summary of the Safe Harbor Agreement, see A.B.A. SECTION OF SCIENCE & TECHNOL-
OGY LAW, INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY 94-97 (Jody R. Westby ed., 2004).
49. Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Privacy Framework, Nov. 20, 2004, available
at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(03995EABC73F94816C2AF4AA26458
24B) -APEC +Privacy+ Framework.pd f/$file/APEC + Privacy+Framework.pdf [hereinafter
APEC Framework].
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contains the Preventing Harm Principle, 0 which focuses on reducing the risk of
harmful misuses of personal data. Data controllers should have specific obliga-
tions to avoid harm and safeguards should be proportional to the risk of harm.
The Notice Principle5 is similar to the Purpose Specification Principle in that
data subjects should be notified of the general privacy policies relating to the data
collection. The Collection Limitation Principle 2 and Uses of Personal Informa-
tion Principle 3 require that data should be collected and used only in accordance
with the purposes of the data collection. However, rather than using the "incom-
patible" criterion found in the OECD Guidelines, there are three exceptions for
using data for other purposes: when consent of the data subject is obtained; to
provide a service requested by the data subject; and by authority of law.14
The Framework further emphasizes procedural rights. The Choice Principle5
directs data controllers to give individuals more choices regarding the collection, use,
and disclosure of data relating to the individuals. The Integrity of Personal Informa-
tion Principle,56 Security Safeguards Principle, Access and Correction Principle, 8
and Accountability Principle 9 are all similar to earlier principles. Despite the Frame-
work's significant changes and additions to data protection standards, data deletion is
mentioned only in the context of deleting inaccurate data that have been challenged
by the data subject. ° The Framework has been endorsed as the most promising set of
data protection standards by several major global actors, including Google.61
5. Global Privacy Standard
The most recent set of proposed data protection principles is the Global Privacy
Standard (GPS).62 Adopted in 2006 by the International Data Protection Commis-












61. Peter Fleischer, Call for Global Privacy Standards, Google Public Policy Blog, http://googlepu-
blicpolicy.blogspot.com/2007/O9/call-for-global-privacy-standards.html (Sept. 14,2007, 11:03 PST).
62. ANN CAVOUKIAN, INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, CREATION OF A GLOBAL PRI-
VACY STANDARD 1 (2006), http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/up-gps.pdf [hereinafter GPS].
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focused on economic regions. It was explicitly designed to be a definitive, global
standard. The data protection commissioners sought to take account of the "strengths
and weaknesses of the major codes in existence" and "harmon[ize] the principles
into a single set of fair information principles.'"3 Most of the principles (accountabil-
ity, collection limitation, purpose, accuracy, security, openness, access, and compli-
ance) are similar to their predecessors. However, three major changes appear.
The Consent Principle6 4 explicitly deals with requiring data subject consent for
the collection, use, and disclosure of data. Although consent was previously men-
tioned in other principles, it is now given greater significance with its own principle.
Under the principle, the more sensitive the information being collected, the more
specific the data subject's consent must be.65 The Collection Limitation Principle66
contains a data minimalization requirement, which holds that if possible, non-iden-
tifying information should be used. If identifying data must be used, then the mini-
mal amount of data required to fulfill the purpose should be collected.
Finally, the Use, Retention, and Disclosure Limitation Principle contains the fol-
lowing provision: "Personal information shall be retained only as necessary to fulfill
the stated purposes, and then securely destroyed.'"7 This is the first general mandate
to securely destroy personal information that is no longer needed by data controllers.
While it is an important step toward completing data protection regulations, the pro-
vision provides a vague criterion for determining when data should be destroyed-
when keeping the data is not necessary to fulfill the stated purposes of the data
collection. While granting discretion to data controllers has benefits, transparency in
the collection and processing of personal data and accountability of data controllers,
as articulated in other principles, requires some limits on that discretion.
Data deletion has been mentioned in some sets of principles - at least obliquely,
in the anonymization provisions. It is time for data deletion to become more fully
developed as a complete data protection principle, like consent and choice principles,
in the Framework and GPS. While procedural protections like consent and choice
are important, substantive safeguards are needed to provide a floor of protection.
Until the substantive protection accorded by destruction of personal data is recog-
nized as an important part of reducing harm and respecting individual autonomy,
63. Id.





data protection principles will not be able to reach their full potential or serve as a
solid foundation for a comprehensive, effective, global data protection regime.
II. THE NEED FOR A DATA DELETION PRINCIPLE
When there is a need for personal data, those data are collected, processed,
transferred, and stored. Take the development of the credit reporting system. Lend-
ers wanted a way to separate reliable borrowers from risky ones. By collecting the
borrowing histories of potential clients, lenders could decide to whom to lend and at
what interest rate. Credit reporting agencies collect information from creditors and
process it (aggregating it into useful reports and producing credit scores), disclose it
(sending credit reports about loan applicants to lenders), and store it for later use.
But what should happen to these data holdings when they no longer fulfill the
purpose for which they were collected? For example, borrowers eventually die, and
their lending histories can no longer help decide if more loans should be granted.
Additionally, the failure to make a payment twenty years ago may no longer accu-
rately reflect a borrower's current reliability. The consequences of maintaining per-
sonal information beyond its useful life are severe enough that they merit adequate
preventative measures that only a complete data deletion principle can provide.
A. Consequences of Needless Data Retention: Reduction in Data Subjects' Autonomy
To respect data subjects' autonomy and human dignity, data subjects must
have some measure of control over the collection, use, and disclosure of data about
them. Because important decisions are made about data subjects on the basis of
the data, lack of control over the data deprives individuals of control over the deci-
sions. "Privacy involves the ability to avoid the powerlessness of having others con-
trol information that can affect whether an individual gets a job, becomes licensed
to practice in a profession, or obtains a critical loan .... It is not merely the collec-
tion of data that is the problem-it is our complete lack of control over the ways it
is used or may be used in the future."6 Generally accepted data protection prin-
ciples, like collection limitation and purpose specification, protect individual au-
tonomy by limiting how much information is collected and requiring that the
purpose be specified, but without a data deletion principle, enforcing other prin-
ciples becomes much more difficult. This is particularly true because principles
regulating collection and notice are generally procedural and not fully utilized by
68. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 51.
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individuals. 69 No one could reasonably exercise all procedural data protection
rights, so substantive protections, like a requirement to destroy unneeded data,
are essential to provide a baseline of data protection.
1. "Function Creep"
Data constitute a flexible resource. Financial records, for example, can be used
for many reasons, such as targeting advertisements at certain economic classes, as-
sessing taxes, or tracking money-laundering and other criminal activities. It is this
malleability that makes purpose specification so crucial to data protection. Without
it, institutions will inevitably be tempted to use data for new purposes, including
purposes that were not specified when the data were collected.
The growing ability to aggregate, compare, and cross-check different data sets
against each other creates many opportunities to use data for purposes other than the
one for which the data were originally collected. For instance, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) collects data on income for the purposes of assessing taxes." The Social
Security Administration (SSA) collects data on any person who applies for a social
security number.7' The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) utilizes an
Automated Targeting System to collect data on people entering and leaving the coun-
try.72 Agencies conduct data matches between databases and combine them to create
new databases.73 Much of the value of data sold by private data aggregators, like
Choicepoint and LexisNexis, derives from the combination of many other private
and public data sets that, once brought together, can be used for other purposes.74
Function creep undermines data subjects' autonomy by depriving them, often
without their knowledge, of any control over their data. Predictably, the availabil-
ity of such data is also very tempting to data controllers. Why collect data all over
again when you can do something useful with existing data? The history of the
social security number amply illustrates the extent to which data can be used for
69. See Cate, supra note 9, 363-64, 366-67.
70. Privacy Act of 1974, as Amended; Systems of Records, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,284, 13,304 (Mar. 12,
2008).
71. Altered System of Records and New Routine Use, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,165, 14,166 (Mar. 24, 1998).
72. Notice of Privacy Act System of Records, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,543, 64,544 (Nov. 2, 2006).
73. See, e.g., Dalia Naamani-Goldman, Anti-terrorism Program Mines IRS' Records: Privacy Advo-
cates are Concerned that Tax Data and Other Information may be Used Improperly, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR 792302. For a review of government data collection and data-
mining, see generally Fred. H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435 (2008).
74. Scott Canon, Pending Merger would Combine Billions of Data Files, KAN. CITY STAR, May 25,
2008, at Al.
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purposes entirely foreign to the original collection.75 Originally created to track
employees' contributions to Social Security, the social security number is now a de
facto national identifier, utilized in banks, educational institutions, and many
other non-Social Security government programs. Deleting unneeded data is the
surest way to avoid the temptation to deviate from the specified purposes and en-
sure respect for individuals' autonomy. While anonymizing unnecessary data pro-
vides some protection, if the data are not needed for their specified purpose, there
is no legitimate reason to retain them. There is a risk that useful data will mistak-
enly be destroyed, but there is always a risk of careless records management. Since
data controllers tend to default to retaining data, the risk of mistaken deletions
does not outweigh the benefits of secure destruction of unneeded data.
2. Stale and Inaccurate Records
As proficient as modern data collection systems are, they are not perfect and
inaccuracies are inevitable. For instance, a portion of credit bureaus' files contain
important errors.76 Every year, a number of people who are still living are re-
corded as deceased by the Social Security Administration (SSA), leading to enor-
mous difficulties for both SSA and the data subjects.77 Errors primarily creep into
data sets in two ways. First, as personal data ages, they are likely to become less
accurate. People frequently move, change jobs, become sick, and change their
buying preferences. Second, the more data that are collected, the more likely it is
that clerical errors will occur. These errors lead to mischaracterizations of indi-
viduals, thereby reducing data subjects' control over their own lives-for example,
by treating them as persons that, in fact, they are not. Individual participation and
access helps address this problem, but the burden for keeping records accurate
and current should not fall solely on the data subject. A data deletion principle
75. See CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE: SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA FROM SLAVERY TO THE
WAR OF TERROR 85-89 (2003).
76. According to one study, 79% of credit files contained errors and 25% of files had errors se-
rious enough to result in wrongful denial of credit. See ALISON CASSADY & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI,
NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUPS, MISTAKES Do HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ER-
RORS IN CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS, 11-13 (2004), available at http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/
BE/ev/BEevuvl9a3KzsATRbZMZlw/MistakesDoHappen2OO4.pdf.
77. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SURVIVOR BENEFITS PAID IN INSTANCES
WHEN THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION REMOVED THE DEATH ENTRY FROM A PRIMARY
WAGE EARNER' S RECORD, Audit Rep. A-06-06-26020 (Sept. 2006) 1-2, available at http://www.
ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-06-06-26020.pdf; Alex Johnson & Nancy Amons, Government Re-
cords Incorrectly Kill off Thousands, and There's No Easy Fix, MSN BC, Feb. 29, 2008, availabe at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23378093/.
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helps eliminate stale and inaccurate records by destroying the very records that
are most likely to be irrelevant, erroneous, or out-of-date.
B. Consequences of Needless Data Retention: Increased Risk of Harm to Individual
Data Subjects
In addition to undermining individuals' dignity and reducing their control
over important life decisions made about them, retaining unneeded data increases
the risk of the data being misused to the detriment of the data subjects. As data
holdings have become more extensive, they are more valuable to criminals who
are capable of using the data to commit fraud.
1. Data Theft, Loss, and Fraud
Personal information has become a valuable commodity for people who seek to
defraud banks, insurance companies, and other corporations. Another individual's
data can be used to fraudulently obtain credit, steal money, avoid the consequences of
a criminal record, cast multiple votes in an election, or illegally gain employment."
While relatively old data may not be useful for some illegal purposes (a ten-
year-old credit card number is unlikely to be valid), some, like a social security
number, can remain very useful. Even the records of deceased individuals can be
used; sometimes, they are more valuable because there is no living victim to com-
plain about the fraud. The longer a data controller retains data, the more likely
that data will be lost or misused. If old data are not destroyed, they accumulate,
increasing the opportunity for loss because there are more data to catalog and se-
cure, and it becomes more difficult to securely transport and store the data. Old
data, especially data that are not being kept for a specific purpose, are less likely to
be used regularly, and thus, security measures may be more lax and breaches more
difficult to promptly detect. When data breaches do occur, they can cause more
damage because they affect more data subjects whose data, if regular data de-
struction were practiced, would have been deleted.
In recent years, numerous data breaches have been reported, some of which con-
tained rather old data and some of which involved data controllers disposing of re-
cords in a way that left the data exposed to misappropriation.79 Even if data are merely
78. See, e.g., Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Identity Crisis: As Society Goes More Hi-tech, so do the Thieves
of Personal Information, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 18, 2008, at 6,availableat 2008 WLNR 15616650.
79. For extensive examples of data breaches, many of which involve old or improperly destroyed
data, see The Breach Blog, http://breachblog.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) and Privacy News,
http://www.pogowasright.org/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
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misplaced or lost, data subjects then have to live with the anxiety of potentially being
harmed through use of the lost data. Under a data deletion principle, some of that
unneeded data would be destroyed, and therefore could not be lost or misused.
2. Harmful Decisions Made on The Basis of Stale and Inaccurate Data
As discussed above, the longer information is retained, the more difficult it is
to keep the data relevant and accurate. Since personal information is used to make
extremely important decisions about individuals, inaccurate information can have
catastrophic consequences for data subjects. Inaccurate medical records can lead
to dangerous treatment decisions; incorrect credit records can result in adverse
loan decisions; and erroneous criminal records can result in unwarranted job ter-
minations." Personal data are useful only to the extent that they are accurate and
current. Thus, a data deletion principle is important not only for reducing the risk
of data subjects being harmed by misuse of their data, but also for increasing the
probability that the data will be suitable for their beneficial purposes.
III. A PROPOSED DATA DELETION PRINCIPLE
Global data protection principles, once universally accepted, will help harmo-
nize national data protection laws, thereby facilitating efficient, transnational
transfers of personal data that serve important social and economic functions.
Unfortunately, data protection principles have thus far given short shrift to data
deletion as a crucial component of an effective global data protection regime. This
omission has left a gap in data protection norms, reducing data controllers' respect
for data subjects' autonomy and exposing data subjects to potential abuse of their
data. The Data Deletion Principle (hereinafter the Principle) proposed below
aims to fill that gap, and its inclusion will make a global data protection regime
more robust by regulating the end of information's life cycle.
A. Text of the Data Deletion Principle
DATA DELETION-All personal information, regardless of format, data
controller, or location, should be securely and verifiably destroyed within:
80. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 46-47.
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a. the time specified in a publicly available data destruction schedule that has
been approved by a legally authorized data protection authority, provided that
the time period is necessary for the specified purpose of the data and does not
exceed ten years after creation of the record; or
b. one year after creation of the record, if the record is not subject to a data de-
struction schedule; unless,
c. the data protection authority approves a longer retention period, including
permanent retention.
The data controller shall have the burden of showing that the longer reten-
tion period is justified by serving the public good or the interests of the data sub-
jects. Data shall be destroyed in accordance with the data destruction schedule
approved in the nation in which the data are collected. Failure to destroy personal
information within the applicable period should render the data controller liable
to any data subjects who are harmed by misuse of information that should have
been deleted. National data protection authorities should ensure that data de-
struction schedules are consistent across industries and jurisdictions. Additionally,
the data protection authorities should enforce compliance through appropriate
legal mechanisms, excluding data controllers with fewer than twenty-five em-
ployees and holding personal data on fewer than five hundred individuals.
B. Implementation of the Data Deletion Principle
Compliance with the Principle will impose administrative burdens on data
controllers, but it is consistent with good record management practices and exist-
ing legal data destruction obligations."' Despite additional cost, securely destroy-
ing unneeded data is simply a part of responsible data management. As such, data
deletion should be considered as important as other data management practices.
1. Application of the Data Deletion Principle
Since personal records are held by both government and private sector data con-
trollers, the Principle must apply equally to both public and private actors. However,
due to the amount of resources required, very small data controllers, those that em-
81. See ANDREW B. SERWIN, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FED-
ERAL, STATE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW §19:9 (2007); PETER P. SWIRE & SOL BERMANN, INFORMA-
TION PRIVACY: OFFICIAL REFERENCE FOR THE CERTIFIED INFORMATION PRIVACY PROFESSIONAL
[CIPPI 173-74 (2007).
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ploy fewer than twenty-five people and control data on fewer than five hundred indi-
viduals, will not be subject to enforcement actions by national data protection
authorities. While these small data controllers will not be penalized by data protec-
tion authorities for neglecting to file data destruction schedules or to destroy data,
they are still liable to individuals who are harmed by abuse of data that are not se-
curely destroyed within the applicable time limits. Imposition of liability provides
some incentive to comply with the Principle, and may also induce insurance compa-
nies to encourage or require compliance as a condition of issuing liability insurance.
2. Data Destruction Schedules
Transparency, accountability, and individual choice are served by requiring
data controllers to catalog and publicly declare their personal data systems and to set
definite retention periods before data will be securely destroyed. Data subjects will
be able to know how long data about them are retained, thus increasing their aware-
ness of the bureaucratic processes that handle the data. Like current privacy policies,
it is unlikely that data destruction schedules will be read by many data subjects.8 2
However, the most basic level of individual access is making information about data
collection, processing, and disposal publicly available. Public destruction schedules
will also facilitate oversight by private actors and data protection authorities.
All data destruction schedules should be filed with, and approved by, autho-
rized data protection authorities. While most nations have government agencies
that serve this function, some may opt to authorize a private or quasi-governmen-
tal entity to approve data destruction schedules. It is important that the authority
vigorously review the schedules and ensure consistency across industries. With
strong enforcement, industry norms that roughly standardize data retention peri-
ods would likely be developed, and the authority would then enforce those norms
by rejecting outlier schedules. For example, if banks generally retained certain
transaction data for five years, the authority would require special justification
before approving a schedule that retains the same data for fifteen years. Just as
telemarketers pay fees to fund federal and state do-not-call registries, review of
data destruction schedules could be funded by the data controllers.
3. Data Retention Periods
The Principle sets a short retention period for transitory data and thus relieves
data controllers from having to catalog it. Any data needed for more than a year will
be cataloged in a schedule. However, data controllers cannot be permitted simply to
82. Cate, supra note 9, at 360-61.
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impose whatever time limit they wish. A data destruction schedule that merely de-
clares that all data will be kept indefinitely is not particularly helpful in terms of
preventing the harms caused by retention of unneeded, stale data. Hence, the data
protection authority must review the retention periods within the submitted data
destruction schedules and ensure that they are necessary to achieve the purposes for
which the data are collected. Admittedly, some data (though probably a relatively
small portion of all data collected) will have to be kept for a long time, perhaps even
permanently. Retention periods over ten years must be justified by the data subjects'
interests or the public interest. Because the retention period is tied to the specified
purpose of the data collection, the risk of function creep is greatly reduced. Data
will be destroyed before new, unrelated uses for the data appear.
4. Secure Destruction
When the retention period for data ends, it is critical that the data be securely
and verifiably destroyed. Otherwise, the data will be exposed to misuse. Verification
of data destruction must be maintained to permit oversight by the data protection
authority and to protect the data controller from liability to data subjects. Mecha-
nisms for secure data destruction, such as shredders and degassers, already exist to
comply with the few data destruction mandates that are currently utilized.
Some personal data can be useful in an anonymized or aggregate form. Such
data, assuming they could not be used to identify individuals, would no longer be
personal information and would not be regulated by data protection principles.
As long as the identifying components of the data are securely deleted, aggregate
data derived from personal data can be used and retained for any reason.
5. Consistency Across Industries and Jurisdictions
A major challenge for the implementation of harmonized national data dele-
tion mandates is maintaining relatively consistent data destruction schedules
across industries and jurisdictions. Unless a supranational data protection author-
ity is created (a project even more ambitious than establishing universal data pro-
tection principles), there will inevitably be some variation among the data
protection authorities' handling of data destruction schedules. This is a difficulty
that is inherent in a system that adopts universal norms while granting discretion
in implementation to each state, and must be accepted at this point in the develop-
ment of a global data protection regime.
Variation can be minimized between data controllers in each nation by the
data protection authorities. Roughly similar retention periods should be required
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for similar systems of personal information collected for like purposes. Multina-
tional corporations should apply similar retention periods within all their subsid-
iaries, regardless of jurisdiction. This will foster consistency across jurisdictions.
This proposal assumes a level of cooperation between national data protection
authorities. A conflict could arise if industry standards in one jurisdiction are too dif-
ferent from legal mandates in another. For instance, search engines in the United
States have begun to delete identifying data in search logs after eighteen months. 3 At
the same time, some European nations are considering data retention laws that re-
quire storage of internet usage data for a longer period.14 While these two examples
do not directly conflict, they indicate diverging balances between privacy and data
retention. Conflicts between these jurisdictions may put data controllers in an unten-
able position of being unable to have approved schedules in both countries.
This is an unavoidable consequence of divergent approaches to data protec-
tion and can be solved only by negotiation and compromise among the national
data protection authorities. It is impossible to have a harmonized, global data de-
letion mandate while permitting wide disparities among jurisdictions' retention
standards. Adoption of a data deletion principle does not end the global dialogue
on data protection; deliberation must continue to establish more specific global
retention standards.
6. Enforcement
Enforcement of the Principle can be accomplished by national data protec-
tion authorities and the individual data subjects who have been harmed by the
misuse of their personal information. Data protection authorities can periodically
audit data controllers' verification records and determine if the data destruction
schedules are being followed. Fines, regulatory orders, and other administrative
measures can help ensure compliance. Data protection authorities will likely focus
their resources on large and systemic violations, while an individual right of ac-
tion for data subjects harmed by misuse of improperly handled data will hold
controllers responsible for smaller violations that lead to actual harm. Large data
breaches, like the TJ Maxx breach, 5 if involving data that were not destroyed in
accordance with data deletion laws, would subject the controller to heavy liability
83. Miguel Helft, Google Adds a Safeguard on Privacy for Searchers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,2007, at
C4.
84. Matthew Sparkes, Government Proposes Emailand Internet Tracking, PCPRo, Aug. 13, 2008,
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/218052/government-proposes-internet-tracking.html.
85. Eric Dash, Data Breach Could Affect Millions of TIX Shoppers, N.Y. TMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at C9.
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to harmed individuals, giving individuals redress and providing a strong incentive
to controllers to destroy data in accordance with applicable retention periods.
The enforcement mechanisms directly relate to the purposes of the Principle:
protecting individual autonomy and avoiding harm. Data protection authorities'
enforcement activities will encourage data destruction norms, protect individual
autonomy, and increase public confidence in data collection, processing, and
global transfer. Furthermore, individual lawsuits will help discourage careless re-
cord disposal and provide redress for harms caused by abuse facilitated by inse-
curely discarded data.
CONCLUSION
With digital capture, processing, transfer, and storage of personal informa-
tion becoming less expensive, it is easy for data controllers to adopt a "packrat"
attitude toward data retention. Why dispose of information when it is cheap to
keep and you never know when it might come in handy? However, this attitude
undermines generally accepted data protection norms and deprives data subjects
of knowledge and control over important decisions made on the basis of their
data. It also increases the chances that the data will be used in ways that deviate
from the data's original purpose and that it will be stolen, lost, or misused to harm
both data subjects and controllers.
The tendency to accumulate and keep personal information indefinitely must
be resisted if global data protection principles are to be as effective as possible. A
data deletion principle is needed that encourages public disclosure of data reten-
tion periods, that is related to the data's purposes, and that is generally consistent
across borders between nations and industries. Unneeded data should be securely
and verifiably destroyed; failure to do so should subject most controllers to admin-
istrative penalties and liability to harmed individuals.
Global transfers of personal data are important and should be encouraged.
Data protection standards that regulate the entire data life cycle, from collection
to deletion, will increase data subjects' confidence in data controllers and lower
legal barriers to moving data across national borders. Collection of personal data
is a global phenomenon, and a global data protection regime that includes data
deletion requirements is best suited to harness the advantages of global data while
minimizing the risks of harm.
